An increasing number of recent corporate scandals and failures worldwide give rise to interest in the corporate governance structure in the performance of companies. This study investigates the relationship between corporate governance characteristics and performance of 66 non-financial companies listed on the Kuwait Stock Exchange (KSE) during the years [2004][2005][2006][2007]. The findings of this study show that corporate governance characteristics such as board size, role duality, and less concentrated share ownership were positively associated with market performance, whereas only board size and role duality were positively related to accounting performance. The result is robust with respect to controls for company size, leverage, and industry.
Introduction
An agency relationship arises from the contract between a company's shareholders (the principals) and its managers (the agents). Under this contract, the shareholders delegate decision-making authority to the managers. In this situation, characterized by a separation of ownership and management function and presence of asymmetric information, a conflict of interest can arise between the shareholders and managers because their interests and objectives differ, and there is no reason to believe that the managers always will act in the shareholders' best interest. For example, managers might be motivated to adopt investment and financing policies that benefit themselves but impair the interests of shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) . To mitigate agency conflicts and reduce their costs, various measures have been suggested (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) . One is corporate governance, which is concerned with ways of bringing the interests of shareholders and managers into line and to ensure that companies are run for the benefits of shareholders (Mayer, 1997) . The Cadbury Committee is the key committee that investigates UK listed companies in 1992 and it describes corporate governance as "the system by which companies are directed and controlled." Hawley and Williams (1997) reviewed a literature of corporate governance in the U.S. and define corporate governance as "a relationship between a company's management, its board, its shareholders, and other stakeholders through enhanced performance." MacMillan and Downing (1999) define corporate governance as "the mechanisms by which companies are controlled and directed." They also point out that corporate governance is a complex issue that influences various factors, including manager relations, board structure and practices, and capital structure.
Prior studies showed that good corporate governance helps achieve the best decision making performance and encourages boards of directors to plans and support the objectives of companies efficiently in the long term. In addition, good corporate governance increases confidence in companies and protects them from changes in market and share prices. Good corporate governance also could lead to better capital valuation and developing companies' ability to reach capital markets (Claessens, Djankov, Fan, and Lang, 2002; Judge, Naoumova, and Koutzevol, 2003) . The recent survey of corporate governance in Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries indicates that corporate governance is an important determinant of performance (OECD, 2004) .
This study investigates the relationship between corporate governance characteristics and performance of non-financial companies listed on the Kuwait Stock Exchange (KSE) between 2004 and 2007. Kuwait offers a particularly appropriate context for the study for three reasons. First, the KSE is an economic indicator of the country with a market capitalization of 63 billion Kuwaiti Dinars (more than US $193 billion) as of 31 December 2007, which corresponds to approximately 26 percent of the Gross Domestic Product of the country (AMF, 2007) . Second, the business environment is characterized by a high concentration of ownership in Kuwait. For example, the mean shareholdings of the largest shareholders of companies in this study are 55 percent, which implies that protection of minority shareholders may be problematic. Third, the October 2008 crisis involving Kuwait's Gulf Bank raised a call for new corporate governance principles by a great number of members of parliament (MPs), the Chamber of Commerce, and the Union of Investment Companies (UIC). This crisis resulted when the bank's board of directors was responsible for using the capital and clients' deposits in risky derivatives.
This study contributes to the body of knowledge in several ways: First, it extends studies that link corporate governance characteristics and corporate performance in a developing country such as Kuwait. Prior studies have been limited primarily to developed countries or large emerging economies; small developing economies such as Kuwait's have been neglected. Therefore, this study was undertaken with the intention of filling the gap. Second, this study seeks to explore whether the corporate governance characteristics associated with performance in Kuwait are similar to or different from those found in studies in other countries.
This study is important to understand corporate governance characteristics in Kuwait and to explore whether these characteristics influence performance of Kuwaiti listed companies. This study may enable companies to make appropriate choices about board appointments and best governance to create and improve performance. In Kuwait, regulators play an important role in protecting investors and keeping confidence in the economy. They may mandate corporate governance code or adopt the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) governance principles as a starting point in Kuwait. This study also is important because there is a growing international recognition of the importance of corporate governance structure for a company's success, given that several organizations and countries have issued guidelines and recommendation for best governance practices and board composition. For example, the OECD's best governance practices issued in 1999 have become an international benchmark for regulators, investors, and companies worldwide.
The results of multivariate analysis of the relationship between corporate governance and performance indicate a significant association between market performance and board size, role duality, ownership concentration, company size, leverage, and industry memberships. In addition, the results indicate a significant association between accounting performance and board size, role duality, and company size. Other corporate governance characteristics do not explain variation in performance. The differences between some of the results of our study and results found in studies of other countries contribute to the corporate governance debate and indicate that corporate governance structures designed to enhance corporate performance cannot be adopted blindly but should take into account the unique business environment that exists in the country concerned.
The reminder of the study is organized as follows. The next section discusses corporate governance in Kuwait. Section three reviews the relevant literature on the relationship between corporate governance characteristics and corporate performance. The hypotheses then are developed in section four. Section five describes the data and the empirical method of the study. The results then are presented and interpreted in section six. The study ends with summary and conclusion, including limitation and avenues for further research in section seven.
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Corporate governance in Kuwait There are 12 provisions concerning corporate governance practices in the company law. Specifically, these provisions concerns the election of boards of directors and their term in office, the vacancy of a board member, the minimum number of meetings of a board of directors in the financial year, and the liability of the board of directors to the company and shareholders. The company law stipulates a minimum of three directors for each company with no ceiling on the maximum number, and the term of office is not more than three years, renewable.
In terms of board composition, the company law provides for the appointment of one or more executive directors by allowing directors to hold concurrently with the office of director any other office or place in the company, but there is no provision for the balance of executives and non-executive directors. In terms of board structure based on duality or otherwise of the chief executive officer's role on the board and in the company itself, the company law does not prevent the appointment of the same individual as chairman of the board of directors and CEO. The company law also does not prohibit multiple directorships nor allow a person to be a director of more than three joint stock companies or CEO or board chairman for more than one joint stock company. The law is silent on creating an audit committee or any other committee.
The KSE law is silent on all of the above provisions. The law only requires that all members of a company's board of directors inform the stock exchange administration of the number of shares owned by the director within one month from the date of their appointment to the board of directors. However, such information is not published only the stock market is informed of it. The law also stipulates that no members of the board of directors of a company may have any direct or indirect interest in contracts and transactions that are concluded with or for the company, unless they have been granted an authorization from the general meeting.
These provisions have not been amended since issuance of the company law in 1960 and stock exchange law in 1983. This study has been undertaken to assess the impact, if any, of these provisions on corporate performance.
3

Literature review
The extant literature on corporate governance, which mostly is about US companies, considers the relationship between corporate governance characteristics and performance. A substantial stream of literature on corporate governance goes back to the argument of Berle and Means (1932) that corporate managers lack accountability and therefore companies need to establish monitoring systems to oversee them. Such an argument was propagated further by Jensen and Meckling (1976) . Review of extant literature shows that a large number of studies investigated the relationship between various corporate governance characteristics and corporate performance. Most of these studies focus on such corporate governance characteristics as board size, board composition (executive versus non-executive), role duality, multiple directorships, and ownership concentration. The review of the literature shows that most prior studies of the relationship between corporate governance characteristics and performance were limited to developed countries and large emerging economies. To the best of the authors' knowledge, no study has focused on the relationship between corporate governance characteristics and performance in Kuwait. This study will fill that gap.
Hypotheses development
Based on the findings of prior theoretical and empirical research, the special characteristics of business environment in Kuwait, and data availability, five corporate governance characteristics are examined for their possible impact on corporate performance. These characteristics are board size, role duality, board composition, multiple directorship, and ownership concentration. Each of these characteristics is discussed and relevant hypotheses developed in the following section.
Size of the board
There has been continued debate on the influence of board size on corporate performance from different perspectives (Jensen, 1993 (Yermack, 1996) , Finland (Eisenberg et al., 1998) , India (Ghosh, 2006) , and Singapore and Malaysia (Mak and Yuanto, 2003) . However, Bhagat and Black (1999) found no relationship between board size and corporate performance in the US; Van, Postman, and Sterken (2008) In Kuwait, company law sets a minimum of three directors for each company but no maximum number. Larger boards may improve corporate performance because they are more likely to have a greater range of expertise and resources to help make better decisions and enhance performance. On the other hand, smaller boards may be better for corporate performance because they are easier to coordinate and communicate and for the CEO to control. These arguments show that board size does have some impact on performance. Accordingly, it is hypothesized that:
H1: There is a significant relationship between board size and corporate performance.
Role duality
Role or Chief Executive Officer (CEO) duality refers to a situation in which a single individual serves as both the CEO and chairman of the board. This creates a unified leadership structure. Lipton and Lorsch (1992) , Worrell, Nemec, and Davidson (1997) , and Carlsson (2001) supported the agency theory with respect to the separation of the two positions, as such separation improves the board's effectiveness in management monitoring that also could lead to improved performance. They contend that CEO duality makes the board inadequate and powerless in the face of a strong CEO. According to Lechem (2002) the board chair plays a critical role in decision making and effective monitoring of the management, headed by the CEO. It also is considered an impediment to the board's flexibility in performing one of its core duties of replacing a poorly performing CEO (Goyal and Park, 2002) and is associated with excessive compensation (Core, Holthausen, and Larcker, 1999). As a consequence, CEO duality is likely to affect corporate performance adversely. Daily and Dalton (1997) state that duality often is a sign of strong CEO power that, combined with a lack of monitoring of board decisions, may have negative consequences for corporate performance. However, supporters of CEO duality (Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Charan, 1998) have argued against separation of chair and CEO positions, on the ground that the company will not have the unified focuses of its energies necessary to realize its goals. They assert that company performance can be enhanced when the CEO had full authority over his or her company by serving in the position of chair, as well.
Previous empirical studies on the issue of the relationship between role or CEO duality and performance have yielded mixed results. There is some evidence that companies that have duality perform better than those with separate leadership (Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Boyd, 1995; Kiel and Nicholson, 2003) . Similarly, Tian and Lau (2001) found a positive relationship between duality and performance for Chinese listed companies. But, there also is conflicting evidence from the UK. Dahaya et al. (1996) found positive evidence for splitting the roles of chairman and CEO whereas Dalton et al.(1998) found no significant performance differences between the companies with CEO duality and those without.
In Kuwait, given that company law does not prevent the appointment of the same individual as a chairman of the board of directors and CEO, a number of listed companies are controlled by the government and its agencies, institutional investors and or a few families and their members occupied the CEO and chairman of the board positions in their companies. This may affect the performance of companies but the effect is unknown. Accordingly, it is hypothesized that:
H2: There is a significant relationship between CEO duality and corporate performance.
Board composition
This variable relates to the proportion of non-executive directors to the total number of directors on the board. Weir and Laing (2001) indicated that boards include two different types of directors: executive (insider) and non-executive (outsider) directors. Executive directors are full-time employees of the company and should have clearly defined roles and responsibilities as they manage the day-to-day operations, while nonexecutive directors are not employees of the company or affiliated with it in any other way.
It has been suggested that boards dominated by non-executive directors may help to alleviate the agency problem by monitoring and controlling the opportunistic behavior of management to ensure that they pursue shareholders' interests (Jensen and Meckling, 1976 ). Pearce and Zahra (1992) argued that boards dominated by non-executive directors may influence the quality of directors' deliberations and decisions and provide strategic direction and improvement in performance. On the other hand, a higher proportion of non-executive directors on the board may be detrimental to companies because they may lack real independence and awareness of their responsibilities, and they may not have the appropriate qualifications and experience (Baysinger and Butler, 1985) .
Empirical evidence was mixed on the performance of companies based on the proportion of non-executive directors to the total number of directors on the board. Millstein and MacAvoy (1998) found US companies with a higher proportion of non-executive directors have a stronger performance than those with a higher proportion of executive directors. In contrast, Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) found a negative relationship between non-executive directors and corporate performance by US companies. Van et al. (2008) found a negative association in the Netherlands. Baysinger and Butler (1985) , Mehran (1995) , and Klein (1998) (2006) in India.
In Kuwait, company law left determining the proportion of non-executive directors to the board of directors, as there is no provision for the balance of executives and non-executives directors. It can be argued that a board with a higher proportion of nonexecutive directors is more likely seen to monitor management and to limit the opportunistic behavior of the CEO than a board dominated by executive directors. On the other hand, boards dominated by non-executive directors may affect performance due to a lack of awareness of their responsibilities and appropriate qualifications and experience. Since prior studies indicated inconsistent results concerning the association between board composition (proportion of non-executive directors) and performance, it is hypothesized that:
H3: There is a significant relationship between the proportion of non-executive directors on the board and corporate performance.
Multiple directorships
Multiple directorships refers to the situation in which directors sit on more than one board. Multiple directorships also are defined as interlocking directors or elite directorships in the corporate governance literature. Several reasons have been suggested for the advantages of a higher proportion of multiple directorships on the board for better performance. Firstly, persons with multiple directorships could provide essential information relating to new policies, trade secrets, and practices among companies that could lead to better performance (Haunschild and Beckman, 1998) . Nisbet and Ross (1980) indicated that information gained via such a mechanism is perceived as more influential and trustworthy compared to other sources. Secondly, such persons may have the opportunity to compare management policy and practices among companies and provide insights into how other companies pursue new approaches to business, leading to better performance (Turnbull, 1997) . Thirdly, they may expose different management styles and monitoring behavior that could lead to better performance (Ferris, Jagannathan, and Pritchard, 2003) .
However, opponents of multiple directorships pointed out a negative or no effect on performance. They argue that persons with multiple directorships may not have the capacity to carry out properly the obligations required of each directorship, making them incapable of monitoring the management of multiple companies effectively, which, in turn, affects their performance because they may spread their time and attention too thinly among their companies (Kiel and Nicholson, 2006) . It also is argued that directors holding multiple directorships also may be too busy to carry out their monitoring and advisory role and, hence, be more likely to be detrimental to corporate performance (Mizruchi and Stearns, 1988) .
Empirical studies that have examined the association between multiple directorships and corporate performance reported mixed results. Kiel and Nicholson (2006) found no relationship between holding multiple directorships and corporate performance in Australia, whereas Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) reported negative association in Malaysia. Boyd (1990) and Mizruchi and Stearns (1988) found that companies with higher proportions of multiple directorships had better performance in US.
As a number of Kuwaiti listed companies are controlled by the government and its agencies, institutional investors, and or a few families, multiple directorships are more common. This may enhance corporate performance because these directors are more likely to be exposed to different policies and ideas and therefore gain more knowledge of business activities. However, multiple directorships may have negative effects on performance due to less commitment of the directors toward the management because they are too busy attending various board meetings. These arguments lead to our next hypothesis:
H4: There is a significant relationship between the proportion of directors on the board with multiple directorships and corporate performance.
Ownership concentration
Ownership concentration has been suggested to be relevant in explaining variations in corporate performance. In agency theory, as ownership separates from management, corporate value may decrease due to growing conflicts of interest between shareholders and management (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) . Conversely, as ownership is more concentrated in a few shareholders, the conflicts between the two is mitigated and there will be greater incentives to align management and shareholders' interests, which could lead to better performance and benefit minority shareholders. On the other hand, concentrated ownership also can affect minority shareholders because the controlling owners can adopt investment and financial policies leading to expropriation of the company's assets, thus affecting performance.
Empirical studies investigating the association between ownership concentration and corporate performance yielded inconclusive results. Wiwattanakantang (2001) and Lins (2003) In Kuwait, according to law No. 2 of 1999, shareholders in listed companies are required to publish their share ownership when it reaches at least 5 percent of the outstanding shares of a company. It appears that three shareholders groups typically have substantial ownership in companies listed on the KSE (Al-Shammari, Brown, and Tarca, 2008). These groups are the government and its agencies, institutional investors, and dominant families. One can expect that there are greater incentives to align management and shareholders' interests, which could lead to better performance and benefit minority shareholders. However, these groups of shareholders are more likely to cooperate with the management, as suggested by the conflicts of interest hypothesis, but are less likely effective to be in monitoring management, leading to poor corporate performance. These arguments lead to the following hypothesis:
H5: There is a significant relationship between shareholdings held by shareholders that who own at least 5 percent of the shares and corporate performance.
Control variables
In this study, three possible variables were included as control variables since corporate performance may be affected by other variables other than corporate governance characteristics. These variables are company size, leverage, and industry memberships.
It can be argued that larger companies are more likely to perform better than smaller companies because they more likely are less risky because of their larger assets and the fact that they typically are multiproduct business entities operating in several geographical areas and divisions. However, smaller companies are more creative, innovative and change more readily to enhance performance (Hannan and Freeman, 1989) . Larger companies are more likely to be exposed to the scrutiny of financial analysts and therefore have a greater incentive to performance well (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006 H6: There is a significant relationship between company size and corporate performance.
Leverage has been shown to be relevant to corporate performance. Debt financing may raise the pressure on managers to perform well because it reduces the moral hazard behavior by reducing free cash flow at the disposal of managers (Jensen, 1986) 
H7: There is a significant relationship between the level of leverage and corporate performance.
Industry membership is included in order to account for any otherwise uncontrolled industryspecific factors that may affect corporate performance. Industry membership may capture the sensitivity of certain industries to changes in growth opportunities, concentrated competitors, and market stability or other macroeconomic factors (Coles, McWilliams, and Sen, 2001; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006) . Schmalensee (1985) and Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) reported that industry membership has an affect on performance, and Elsayed (2007) also reported an industry effect in Egypt. Accordingly, it is hypothesized that:
H8: There is a significant relationship between industry memberships and corporate performance.
Research methods
This section describes the research method of the study including sample description and data collection.
Sample and data
The sample for the study was drawn from companies listed on the KSE. Listed companies are selected because these are the top companies in Kuwait and thus are likely to possess greatest potential to attract and employ skilled and competent individuals on the boards of directors. These companies have good access to capital and other resources necessary not only for survival but also for improving their performance and competitive position. Elsayed, 2007) . The accountingbased measures have included return on assets, return on equity, and return on investment. The market-based measures have included Tobin's Q ratio. These measures have been criticized by different researchers. For example, accounting measures were criticized for being backward looking and constrained by professional accounting standards in each country. On the other hand, market-based measures such as Tobin's Q ratio is based on the perception of investors and thus affected by their psychology and influenced by the estimates of future events, such as manipulation (Kapopoulos and Lazaretou, 2007) . However, although these measures have been criticized, they have been used in most corporate governance-performance studies.
The current study uses two measures: one is an accounting-based measure and the other is a marketbased measure, which is consistent with prior governance-performance studies. The accountingbased measure used in the study is return on assets (ROA) because it reflects mainly operating results rather than capital structure decisions (Carter, Elsayed, 2007) . The market-based measure used is Tobin's Q ratio because it is a long-term measure that takes risk and return dimensions into account (Manuel, Carol, Jerry, and Jennigs, 1996), and reflects the firm's ability to improve performance over time (Caton, Goh, and Donaldson, 2001 ). The higher the value of Tobin's Q, the more effective are the governance mechanisms and the better is the market's perception of the company's performance (Weir et al., 2002) . This measure also has been used in previous studies on corporate performance (e. 
The independent variables
The independent variables are five corporate governance characteristics (board size, role duality, board composition, multiple directorships and ownership concentration) and three control variables (company size, leverage, and industry memberships). Table 2 summarizes the dependent and independent variables and their proxies. 
Statistical methods
Following previous studies, multivariate regression analysis has been used to investigate the relationship between the dependent and independents variables. Since multivariate regression is used to test the hypotheses, assumption of multicollinearity also is tested. One reason for doing this is to indicate whether multicollinearity could cause estimation problems. The Pearson correlation matrix is used to test the multicollinearity assumption. Table 3 shows the correlation matrix for the dependent and continuous independent variables. It indicates no multicollinearity problem since the pair-wise correlation coefficients are less than 0.80 (Gujarati, 2003) . Table 4 presents the descriptive analysis for the dependent and continuous independent variables. For the dependent variables, as shown in the table, the mean for the Q-ratio decreased over time, possibly indicating the continued decrease of companies' debt due to changes in bank's requirements. As for the ROA, it can be seen that the mean increased in 2005 and decreased in 2006. This can be attributed to the volatility of the market value growth.
Results
For the continuous independent variables, the table shows that the average board size of Kuwaiti companies is six, with a maximum of eleven members and a minimum of three. This is inconsistent with the board size recommended by the Cadbury Committee report for board effectiveness. It recommends that the size of the board to be between eight and ten members for board effectiveness. Comparing the average size of the Kuwaiti companies' boards with other companies in different countries indicates that it is lower than US companies (average size 14 members) (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996) and UK companies (11 members) (Guest, 2009 ). In terms of board composition, the mean percentages of non-executive directors on the boards for all years are above 80 percent, indicating that non-executive directors remain in the majority of Kuwaiti boards. With respect to role duality, the number of companies ** Significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed). * Significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed). Q-Ratio was the ratio of the market value of shares plus total debt divided by the book value of total assets of the company; ROA was measured by earnings after Zakat and tax divided by total assets of the company; BSize was measured by the total number of directors on the board of the company; BCom was the proportion of non-executive directors to total number of directors on the board of the company; Mult was the proportion of directors on the board of the company having at least one additional directorship in another company to total number of directors on the board; TShareholders was the proportion of shares owned by shareholders that own at least 5 percent of the shares to total shares outstanding in the company; CSize was measured by the total assets of the company at the year-end and Lever was the proportion of total debt to total assets of the company. 0.294 0.207 0.02 0.76 Q-Ratio was the ratio of the market value of shares plus total debt divided by the book value of total assets of the company; ROA was measured by earnings after Zakat and tax divided by total assets of the company; BSize was measured by the total number of directors on the board of the company; Dual is a dichotomous with 1 if the chairman is also Chief executive officer (CEO) of the company and 0 otherwise; BCom was the proportion of non-executive directors to total number of directors on the board of the company; Mult was the proportion of directors on the board of the company having at least one additional directorship in another company to total number of directors on the board; TShareholders was the proportion of shares owned by shareholders that own at least 5 percent of the shares to total shares outstanding in the company; CSize was measured by the total assets of the company at the year-end, and Lever was the proportion of total debt to total assets of the company.
with role duality has increased from 59 percent in 2004 to 67 percent in 2007, and the mean for the entire four-year period is 63 percent, suggesting that role duality is common in Kuwaiti companies. Surprising, the mean percentage of directors on the boards having directorships in at least one additional company for all years and each year is above 40 percent with only one company having all of its board members with additional directorships. The average percentage of shares held by shareholders that own at least 5 percent of the shares to total shares outstanding in the company is about 55 percent each year, indicating concentrated ownership in most Kuwaiti companies.
With respect to control variables, the mean for company size has increased over time from 85 KD million in 2004 to 250 KD million in 2007 with the mean for all years is about 168 KD million. The mean for the leverage ratio is between 29-37 percent with the mean for all years about 33 percent. For the industry membership, there were 19 real estate companies (76 observations for four years), 21 manufacturing companies (84 observations), 21 services companies (84 observations) and 5 food companies (20 observations).
Results Based on market Measure
This study is concerned with investigating the relationship between corporate governance characteristics and performance of non-financial listed companies in the KSE between 2004 and 2007. Table  5 reports the results from the regression model linking corporate governance and performance based on Tobin's Q. The F-value for the combined four-year period and each year is significant at the 1 percent level. The adjusted R 2 for the combined four-year period is 0.179 and for each of the four years is between 0.277 and 0.301.
Board size (BSize) is found to have a significant relationship with performance measured by market measure in 2005 and for the combined four years. This finding lends support to hypothesis 1, which predicts a significant relationship between board size and performance. The positive result supports the findings of Chiang (2005) in Taiwan and Mak and Li (2001) in Singapore, who suggest that larger boards allow for more effective monitoring by reducing the domination of the CEO within the board, resulting in reduced agency costs and having a greater range of expertise and resources to help make better decisions and enhancing performance. Role duality (Dual) is found to be associated significantly and positively with market performance in 2004 and the combined four years and hence hypothesis 2 is accepted. The results support the findings of Boyd (1995) and Dahya et al. (1996) , who suggest that role duality allow for the unified focuses of energies necessary to realize the goals and hence enhance performance. The proportion of non-executive directors to total number of directors on the board (BCom) is found to have a significant relationship with performance in 2004, hence supporting hypothesis 3. The negative finding suggests that market performance is better with fewer nonexecutive directors on the board, as executive directors manage the day-to-day operations and therefore are aware of their responsibilities, which may enhance performance. This result is consistent with Agrawal and Knoeber (1996), Van, Postman, and Sterken (2008) Yermack (1996) and Bhagat and Black (1999) . The proportion of shares held by shareholders that own at least 5 percent of shares (TShareholders) is found to have a significant relationship with the performance in 2005, 2006, 2007 , and the pooled data and therefore hypothesis 5 also is not rejected. The negative result suggests that performance is better with less concentrated ownership due to growing conflicts of interest between the managements and the shareholders, and hence effective monitoring.
This finding is consistent with Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) . Multiple directorships (Mult) is not significant and hence hypothesis 4 is not accepted. This result supports the arguments of Mizruchi and Stearns (1988) that multiple directorships have no effect on corporate performance because they may be busy to carry out their duties and responsibilities on the boards.
With respect to control variables, the results indicate a significant relationship between company size (CSize) and market performance in 2005, 2006, 2007 , and the pooled data. The negative result supports hypothesis 6. This finding suggests that smaller companies are more creative and change more readily to enhance performance than larger companies. This result is consistent with Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) and Weir et al. (2002) .
The control variable leverage is also significantly associated with market performance for the pooled data and for all years except 2007. The positive result supports hypothesis 7, therefore implying that the market perceives leverage as an effective mechanism to control management and improve performance. This finding is consistent with Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) . There are significant differences between industry groups in the pooled data and for each year except 2007. This finding supports hypothesis 8. Companies in the service industry are significantly different from the food industry (represented by the constant). This implies that companies in the service industry seemed to perform better than companies in the food industry. This finding is consistent with Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) in Malaysia and Elsayed (2007) in Egypt. Table 6 reports the results from the regression model concerning the relationship between corporate governance characteristics and performance based on ROA. The F-value for the combined four-year period and each year is significant at the 1 percent level except for 2007, in which it is significant at 5 percent. The adjusted R 2 for the combined four-year period is 0.232 and for each of the four years is between 0.210 and 0.321.
Results Based on Accounting Measure
The variable board size (BSize) is found to be associated significantly with accounting performance measure for the years 2005, 2006, 2007 , and the pooled data in the positive direction. This result is the same direction to market performance. This implies that board size is related positively to performance irrespective of the performance measure used. Role duality (Dual) is found to be significantly related to accounting performance measure in 2004, 2005, 2007 , and the pooled data. This finding also is consistent when using market performance. Board composition (BCom) is found to have a significant relationship in 2004 in a positive direction. Unlike market performance, the proportion of shares owned by shareholders that own at least 5 percent of the shares to total shares outstanding in the company (TShareholders) is found to be insignificantly related to accounting performance for each year and pooled data. This implies that ownership concentration has no effect on accounting performance. Multiple directorships (Mult) again is not significantly associated with accounting performance.
The The results indicated that role duality is common in Kuwaiti companies. It is significant when using both market and accounting performance. It allows for the unified energy focus necessary to realize the goals and hence enhance performance. Company law does not prevent role duality; therefore, it would be better for Kuwaiti companies to appoint one individual to the two offices for better performance.
Board composition does not seem to influence performance, irrespective of the measured used. This could be related to the fact that in Kuwait, most nonexecutive directors were selected not because of their expertise and experience but more likely for contacts. Consequently, such directors may not be able to contribute to independent monitoring and reducing agency conflicts. Therefore, it would be best for regulators to encourage companies to select those who have real independence and awareness of their responsibilities, along with relevant qualifications, expertise, and experience.
The results indicate that multiple directorships do not seem to affect performance. This supports the argument of Kiel and Nicholson (2006) , who suggest that persons with multiple directorships may not have the capacity to carry out properly the obligations required of each director leading to an inability to monitor the management of multiple companies effectively because they may spread their time and attention too thinly among their companies. Therefore, this implies that multiple directorships do not add value to performance in Kuwait. Since multiple directorships are a common phenomenon in the Kuwaiti listed companies due to the fact that company law does not prohibit multiple directorships, it would be an important issue to be considered by the Ministry of Commerce in its efforts to remedy corporate governance practices. *** Significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed).** Significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed), * Significant at the 0.10 level (twotailed). Q-Ratio was the ratio of the market value of shares plus total debt divided by the book value of total assets of the company; BSize was measured by the total number of directors on the board of the company; Dual is a dichotomous with 1 if the chairman is also Chief executive officer (CEO) of the company and 0 otherwise; BCom was the proportion of nonexecutive directors to total number of directors on the board of the company; Mult was the proportion of directors on the board of the company having at least one additional directorship in another company to total number of directors on the board; TShareholders was the proportion of shares owned by shareholders that own at least 5 percent of the shares to total shares outstanding in the company; CSize was measured by the total assets of the company at the year-end, and Lever was the proportion of total debt to total assets of the company. For industry variables, three dummy variables were included to four industries, the results for industry 4 (food) were captured in the constant term. at the 0.01 level (two-tailed). ** Significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed), * Significant at the 0.10 level (two-tailed). ROA was measured by Earnings after Zakat and tax divided by total assets of the company; BSize was measured by the total number of directors on the board of the company; Dual is a dichotomous with 1 if the chairman is also CEO of the company and 0 otherwise; BCom was the proportion of non-executive directors to total number of directors on the board of the company; Mult was the proportion of directors on the board of the company having at least one additional directorship in another company to total number of directors on the board; TShareholders was the proportion of shares owned by shareholders that own at least 5 percent of the shares to total shares outstanding in the company; CSize was measured by the total assets of the company at the year-end and Lever was the proportion of total debt to total assets of the company. For industry variables, three dummy variables were included to four industries, the results for industry 4 (food) were captured in the constant term.
The results based on market performance were better, with less concentrated share ownership due to growing conflicts of interest between the management and the shareholders, and hence effective monitoring. However, when analysis was considered in terms of accounting performance, no significant relationship existed. Recently, the government of Kuwait has been trying to attract investors and encourage all shareholders to play active monitoring roles. Hence, steps need to be undertaken by the Ministry of Commerce and KSE to encourage all shareholders to align the interests of management and shareholders.
The study made two important contributions. First, it extends studies that investigated the relationship between corporate governance characteristics and company performance in developing country such as Kuwait. The findings explore empirically the importance of corporate governance structure in Kuwait, an area that has received little attention to date in Kuwait. Previous studies have been focused mainly on developed countries or large emerging economies. It seems that small developing economies such as Kuwait's are neglected. Therefore, this study was undertaken with the intention of filling the gap. Second, this study also seeks to explore whether there are differences between the corporate governance characteristics associated with performance in Kuwait and those found in other studies in different countries.
Notwithstanding the findings, this study suffers from the following limitations, which would represent potentially opportunities for further investigation. First, this study used a regression model. Future studies may investigate the relationship between performance and corporate governance characteristics using a simultaneous equations framework, similar to that used by Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) . The strength of this approach is that control mechanisms are determined simultaneously (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996) . Second, although the model has explained a significant part of the variation in performance, still unexplained is a material part that represents the "noise" of the model. Data availability limited the ability to study other aspects of corporate governance variables, such as characteristics of the remuneration and nominating committees and share ownership by managers. These variables have been found to be important theoretically and empirically in other corporate governance structure studies. As information of these variables becomes available about Kuwaiti companies, the effects of such factors on performance should be examined.
In addition, future studies may want to consider the impact of share ownership held by executive and non-executive directors on performance. Third, future study also could explore the endogeneity in the determination of internal governance structure in Kuwait by using a different research method. Future research also could use structured interviews with those involved in the oversight of the governance structures within the company; this may enhance understanding of governance structures appropriate for adoption in Kuwait. Future research could extend our study by undertaking comparative studies with other Middle Eastern countries, such as members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) (Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia), as this may benefit regulators in these states in their efforts to harmonize their commercial and governance regulations in the Gulf.
The results of this study have important implications for the regulators in Kuwait in their efforts to increase the efficiency of the rapidly developing capital markets and in protecting investors and keeping confidence in the economy. They may mandate a corporate governance code or adopt the OECD corporate governance principles as a starting point in Kuwait. Kuwaiti companies may use the findings to make appropriate choices about board appointments and best governance to create and improve performance. Investors also may use the findings to understand Kuwaiti companies. Such findings may assist them to diversify their investment portfolios.
